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NOTES
THE JUVENILE JURY TRIAL CASE-A REGRETTABLE
"POLICY DECISION"
Appellants were adjudged delinquents in separate and un-
related juvenile proceedings. In each instance a request for a
jury trial was denied by the hearing court. All cases were
affirmed on appeal to the highest court of their respective states.1
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,2 and the
cases were consolidated for consideration. Held, a trial by jury
is not constitutionally required in the adjudicative phase of a
state juvenile court delinquency proceeding. McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania, 91 S.Ct. 1076 (1971).
The need for strengthening of juvenile rights and interests
through the establishment of separate judicial proceedings was
recognized in America during the nineteenth century, largely
through the efforts of the reformers of that day.8 It was felt that
1. One case, from North Carolina, involved 46 black children charged
Individually with wilfully impeding traffic, misdemeanors under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-174.1 (1965). The charges resulted from a protest demonstration
by black children and adults. In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879
(1969), noted in 48 N.C. L. REv. 666 (1970).
Joseph McKeiver, aged 16, was charged in Philadelphia, Pa., with rob-
bery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods, felonies under Pennsylvania law
(PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4704, 4807, and 4817 (1965)). The essence of the
charge against McKeiver was the participation in the theft of some twenty-
five cents from three younger teenagers. Pennsylvania law provides for an
adjudication of delinquency upon a finding that a minor has violated a law
of the Commonwealth. Id. tit. 11, § 243(4)(a). Another Pennsylvania case,
that of Edward Terry, aged 15, was consolidated with McKeiver's for con-
sideration by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In re Terry, 438 Pa. 339, 265
A.2d 350 (1970). Terry was charged with conspiracy and assault and battery
on a police officer, misdemeanors in Pennsylvania under id. tit. 18, §§ 4708,
4302. It was alleged that Terry and another youth hit a police officer with
their fists and a stick when the officer broke up a boys' fight which Terry
and others were watching.
Of all the children involved in these cases, only Terry, who had a prior
record of delinquency, was committed to a youth development center. He
faces incarceration there until he attains the age of 21, a total of six years
loss of freedom. Id. tit. 11, §250. Although all 47 other juveniles were placed
on probation, each faced a similar potential length of incarceration.
2. 397 U.S. 1036 (1970), consoldated, 399 U.S. 925 (1970).
3. H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (1927). The first
formal juvenile tribunal Is acknowledged to have been that of Cook County,
Illinois, established In 1899. S. GLUECK & E. GLUECK, ONE THOUSAND JUVE-
NILE DELINQUENTS 12 (1943). The earliest law In the United States with the
purpose of separating juvenile and adult offenders was passed by Massa-
chusetts in 1863. The legislation, which proved inadequate, was replaced In
1872 by a provision empowering police and courts to arrange separate hear-
ings of juvenile offenders apart from other criminal cases. A law passed
In 1877 used the term "session for juvenile offenders," probably for the first
time. 0. NYQUisT, JUVENILE JusTic 141 (1960). Also in 1877, New York passed
[133]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
the juvenile would benefit more from the protection of the state
than from punishment for his offenses, at least prior to a certain
age of responsibility.4
The carefully delineated boundaries which distinguished ju-
venile proceedings from criminal trials5 began to blur noticeably
with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Haley v.
Ohio!6 in 1948. Haley involved the admissibility of a confession
obtained from a 15-year old accused of first-degree murder. The
youth had confessed following five hours of continuous interro-
gation beginning at midnight. In light of this and other facts
there developed,7 the Court held that the due process clause
barred the use of the confession.8 Mr. Justice Douglas, writing
for the majority, stated that "[n]either man nor child can be
allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitu-
tional requirements of due process of law."9
In 1966, the question of due process for juveniles was again
presented to the Court in Kent v. United States.10 The majority
stated that the latitude" allowed the juvenile court was not
legislation requiring segregation of juveniles from adults in institutions,
courts, and police vehicles. H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES
16-17 (1927).
4. E. ELDEFONSO, LAw ENFORCEMENT AND THE YOUTHFUL OFFENDER 158
(1967).
5. The juvenile court system "was designed to eliminate the ancient, ac-
cusatory, prosecutive, punitive approach: to depose the state from its ag-
gressive, hostile role; and to substitute a nonadversary, nonpunitive, solici-
tous approach aimed to protect and correct the child malefactor." Alexander,
Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, in JUsTIcE FOR THE CHILD 84 (M.
Rosenheim ed. 1962).
"[C]ertain pecularities of [juvenile] courts ... have greatly reduced
their juridical character and have made them like administrative boards ...
[P]rivacy of hearings and decisions, the denial of jury trial, and greater
informality of procedure ... characterize the children's court .... [Tihe
perils of the accused are increased by the systematic exclusion of counsel
in many places, the denial of a right to appeal in some, a very general dis-
regard of the rules of evidence .... [and] few means to check error or
abuse." Tappan, Juridical & Administrative Approaches to Children with
Problems, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 156 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962). The author's
description, although it refers to current procedure in a particular juvenile
court system, is an accurate account of the procedural differences that have
existed for many years.
6. 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
7. The interrogation was conducted by officers working in relays; the
youth was not warned of his rights; and he had not the benefit of advice of
friends, family, or counsel. Id. at 600.
& Accord, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), where a 14-year-old
was on trial.
9. 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948).
10. 883 U.S. 541 (1966).
11. The 16-year-old Involved in Kent had been remitted to the federal
district court from a juvenile court for trial in accordance with the provi-
NOTES
complete; rather it assumed "procedural regularity sufficient in
the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of
due process and fairness.' 2 The parens patriae'3 philosophy of
the juvenile court system was said not to confer "an invitation
to procedural arbitrariness.' 1 4
In re Gault 5 represents the landmark Supreme Court deci-
sion in the area of juvenile justice. Due process for juveniles
was in that case defined in specific terms as comprising, at mini-
mum, written notice of charges; the right to the advice of coun-
sel, retained or appointed; the right of confrontation and cross-
examination; and protection against compelled self-incrimina-
tion. The Court declined to rule on two additional protections,
the right to a transcript of the proceedings and the right of ap-
pellate review. Gault, fifteen years old, had been committed to
an Arizona industrial school for a possible term of six years upon
conviction of a charge that, had he been an adult, would have
subjected him to a maximum fine of fifty dollars or imprison-
ment for not more than two months."' The proceedings against
him included none of the four essential guarantees aforemen-
tioned; therefore, his adjudication of delinquency was reversed
by the Supreme Court. The majority opinion contained some
rather sweeping language, including the statement that "neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone."1 In referring to juvenile offenders in general, it was
stated that:
"The boy is committed to an institution where he may be
restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional
consequence-and of limited practical meaning-that the
sions of D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1553 (1965), permitting such remittance after a
"full investigation." However, the judge who waived juvenile jurisdiction
in Kent's case held no hearing, made no findings, and gave no reason for
the waiver while refusing to consider a motion by Kent's counsel for a
hearing on the waiver questions. After conviction in the district court, he
received a sentence of from 30 to 90 years in prison.
12. 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966).
13. Translated as "parent of the country," BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1269
(4th ed. 1951). Generally used in this context as referring to the responsi-
bility of the juvenile court to function in a "parental" relationship to the
child.
14. 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
15. 387 U.S. 1 (1967), noted In 28 LA. L. Rv. 492 (1968) and 14 LOYOLA L.
Rav. 195 (1968).
16. The charge was uttering indecent language over the telephone, a
violation of ARIz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13-377 (1956).
17. 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
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institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial
School . . . . [Under the conditions of confinement the child
is likely to experience in such a school] it would be extra-
ordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural
regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase
'due process.' Under our Constitution, the condition of being
a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."'
The due process standard for juveniles was extended again
by the United States Supreme Court in the 1970 case of In Re
Winship.' Proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was there
established as the necessary constitutional measure for juveniles
as well as adults, thus overturning a New York statute which
permitted an adjudication of delinquency on a preponderance of
the evidence.
Seventy years of jurisprudence, then, have seen an ever-
increasing extension of constitutional protections to juvenile
proceedings: the right to counsel; the privilege against self-in-
crimination; freedom from coerced confession; the right to ade-
quate written notice; and a standard of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. The Court has extended these protections through
tacit recognition of the great similarity between adjudicative
delinquency proceedings and adult criminal trials. The applica-
bility of other traditional criminal safeguards, one of them being
the right to trial by jury, was still to be decided.
Duncan v. Louisiana2O provided a guarantee of the right to
trial by jury in all state criminal cases which, were they tried in
federal court, would come under the sixth amendment's protec-
tion. In defining what offenses would be accorded such protec-
tion, the majority opinion stated that "the penalty authorized for
a particular crime is of major relevance in determining whether
it is serious or not and may in itself, if severe enough, subject
the trial to the mandates of the Sixth Amendment."21 While
Duncan recognized that there exists a category of petty crimes
not subject to the jury trial provision, the Court later specifically
held that any crime with a possible penalty in excess of six
18. Id. at 27-28.
19. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
20. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
21. Id. at 159.
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months would entitle the perpetrator to the constitutional pro-
tection.22
In DeBacker v. Brainard23 the Supreme Court side-stepped
the juvenile jury trial issue on the basis that the appellant's
juvenile court hearing had been held prior to the Duncan deci-
sion and that Duncan was to have only prospective application. 24
Prior to the DeBacker decision, however, a three-judge federal
district court had confronted the issue squarely, in Nieves v.
United States.2 5 In that case the Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act2 68 (FJDA) was held unconstitutional insofar as it mandated
the absence of trial by jury. Relying upon the concern expressed
in Gault for the constitutional rights of juveniles, the court held
that the requirement of the FJDA that a juvenile must waive
his right to jury trial in order to be tried as a juvenile for of-
fenses that were criminally punishable presented a "Hobson's
choice,"' and read Gault "to require the availability of that right
[to jury trial] in any federal juvenile proceeding in which a
youth is faced with incarceration for the commission of an act
alleged to be violative of federal law.' 28 Although this case dealt
solely with federal law and federal courts, the reasoning 29 that
prompted the court's decision is equally applicable to state pro-
ceedings.
Duncan and Gault, when considered together with the earlier
cases extending constitutional protection to juveniles, would
logically seem to dictate the extension of the right to jury trial
to juvenile proceedings. But the availability of that option is
denied by the instant case, and apparently the perimeter of due
process for juveniles is now delineated.
22. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
23. 396 U.S. 28 (1969).
24. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
25. 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 5033 (1964).
27. 280 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (S.D. N.Y. 1968). The term is defined as "an
apparent freedom to take or reject something offered when In fact no such
freedom exists: . . . something that one must accept through want of any
real alternative." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1076 (1969).
28. 280 F. Supp. 994, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
29. Citing Gault's classification of juvenile proceedings as criminal In
nature for the purpose of finding that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion applied, the court in NMeves said: "When forced to decide whether
juvenile court proceedings were civil or criminal in order to determine the
applicability of a federal right which turns on the distinction, the Court did
not hesitate in choosing the latter. We are convinced that this classification
applies equally to the right of trial by jury In a juvenile court proceeding."
Id.
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The majority begins its reasoning process by asserting that
imposing jury trials upon juvenile adjudicative proceedings
would not greatly strengthen the fact-finding function, if indeed
it would at all.30 The rationale seems to be that the jury is not
as qualified as the judge to make accurate findings in a juvenile
proceeding.31 However, for at least 500 years the jury system
has been recognized in Anglo-American jurisdictions as an ex-
ceptionally able fact-finding body,8 2 providing a safeguard against
abuse by the government of the judicial process as well as pro-
tection from the biased judge. The jury trial is now firmly
established as an essential element of a fair trial in serious
criminal cases.33 The functions of the fact finder-evaluating
credibility of witnesses, weighing of evidence, and applying
legal principles to the questions presented-are of equal diffi-
culty whether an adult or a juvenile is being tried for the
offense.
A recent study3 4 illustrates that often a judge has access to
information not properly a matter for factual determination. 35
This is especially true of the juvenile court judge, who has ac-
cess to social records and probation reports containing hearsay
and highly prejudicial data not necessarily relevant to the par-
ticular charge facing the accused youth.8 Those who would re-
30. 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1987 (1971).
31. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINIS-
TRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENmL DgLINQUENCY AND YOUTH
CRIME 7-8 (1967) (hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT). The majority
characterizes the report as "notable for its not making any recommendation
that the jury trial [be made available to juveniles] ... despite its vivid
description of the system's deficiencies and disappointments." 91 S.Ct. 1976,
1986 (1971). See also note 42 infra.
32. S. MCCART, TRIAL BY JURY 7 (1964). The author cites the first record
of a jury trial conducted generally as at present as being contained in a
Year Book of decisions during the reign of Henry IV (1399-1413). The com-
monly accepted theory that the jury trial was established by the Magna
Charta in 1215 is rejected by McCart. Id. at 5.
33. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968). See generally R.
Henry, The Story of the Criminal Jury, in LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORRIN
Kip McMuRRAY 162-63 (M. Radin & A. Kidd eds. 1935).
34. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
35. Id. at 127: "[Tlhe judge is exposed to prejudicial information which
the law, in its regard for the rights of the defendant, aims to screen out of
the evaluation of his guilt or innocence."
36. Cf. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), where it was held that due
process was violated by a particular judge presiding over the contempt trial
of an individual where the same judge had witnessed the alleged act of con-
tempt during a one-man grand jury proceeding presided over by that same
judge. It was there said that ". . . 'every procedure which would offer a
possible temptation to the average man as a judge ... not to hold the bal-
ance [of justice] nice, clear and true . . . denies [the accused] due process
of law.'" Id. at 136. Murchison represents a unique fact situation, but one
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tain the judge as the sole trier of fact argue that his long ex-
perience will prevent him from being unduly prejudiced by such
information. It is submitted, however, that the juvenile judge's
experience27 does not remove the danger of prejudice. On the
other hand, the jury would not be exposed to such unduly prej-
udicial material and the dangers would therefore be eliminated.
The majority substantiates its decision by stating that "[t]he
Court has refrained . ..from taking the easy way with a flat
holding that all rights constitutionally assured for the adult
accused are to be imposed on the . . . juvenile proceedings. '33
But the Duncan decision, with regard to this particular consti-
tutional protection in cases where an offense punishable by two
years in prison was alleged, is clearly in point. Insofar as juve-
nile offenders, upon an adjudication of delinquency, face com-
mitment to institutions until they reach majority-a punishment
that may span eleven years or more39-it seems a contradiction
to deny them the protection considered so important in Duncan.
The analogy between a delinquency proceeding and an adult
criminal trial for a "serious" crime was recognized in Gault:
"[a] proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be
found to be a 'delinquent' and subjected to the loss of his liberty
for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. '40
In the absence of a meaningful distinction between an adjudi-
cative delinquency hearing and an adult criminal proceeding,
that is not without parallel in many juvenile court jurisdictions throughout
the United States.
The conduct of social investigations before, rather than after, juvenile
hearings has been characterized as a "procedural perversion." Tappan, Juri-
dical & Administrative Approaches to Children with Problems, in JusTicM
FOR THE CHILD 156 (M. Rosenheim ed. (1962).
37. A problem created by the judge's experience is illustrated by the fact
that the same social workers and probation officers are likely to be called
upon to appear in one juvenile hearing after another, and the inescapable
result is that the presiding judge will be well acquainted or probably friendly
with these individuals. At the same time, the juvenile involved is highly
likely to have appeared before the judge on one or more prior occasions. It
is submitted that this creates an inevitable tendency on the judge's part to
see a familiar pattern, whether one exists or not, with the likelihood that
the judge will be inclined to categorize witnesses and youthful offenders alike.
38. 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1986 (1971).
39. The Louisiana Criminal Code states that "[t]hose who have not
reached the age of ten years are exempt from criminal responsibility." (Em-
phasis added.) LA. R.S. 14:13 (1950). The Revised Statutes provide that a
child, defined as a person less than seventeen years of age (id. 13:1569),
is subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court for purposes of detention
until he attains the age of 21 years. Id. 13:1572. It is unclear at what mini-
mum age children are liable for acts of delinquency and hence the maximum
period of confinement possible can not be determined with certainty.
40. 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
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Gault and Duncan demand that jury trial be granted when re-
quested.41 Using the potential loss of liberty as a yardstick, the
absence of any such meaningful distinction is apparent.
Another basis for the instant decision was that requiring a
jury trial would convert the juvenile process into a fully adver-
sary proceeding, thereby putting an end "to what has been the
idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceed-
ing." 42 Apparently the majority was of the opinion that the
nature of juvenile proceedings is inconsistent with the concept
of jury trial. Admittedly, procedural due process effects greater
formality, but the concept of informality of proceedings as being
in the best interests of the child had already been qualified in
both Gault and Kent to the extent that such informality must
give way to the assurance of due process. 48 The informality of
juvenile proceedings has been recognized to contribute more
often to a denial of due process than to a furthering of the young
offender's best interests.44 An informal hearing promotes pos-
sible arbitrariness and unfettered judicial discretion not always
in the best interests of the child.45 The dangers thus engendered
have evoked considerable concern, and the belief that there is
41. Note, 48 N.C. L. REv. 666, 669 (1971). This conclusion is predicated
in large part on the sweeping language found in the majority's opinion in
Gault. However, in the instant case, the majority seems to disregard the
broad statements of policy in Gault, apparently adopting instead Justice
Robert's opinion for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which found Gault
"a paradox, being both broad and narrow at the same time." Justice Rob-
erts' classification of the decision as "narrow" seems to be based on the
Gault court's failure to reach and decide the questions of a right to a tran-
script and of a right to appellate review. See 438 Pa. 339, 343, 265 A.2d 350,
353 (1970).
42. 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1986 (1971). It is now generally recognized, however,
that the lofty ideals of the social experiment that Is the juvenile court sys-
tem have not been realized. Comment, 22 MIAMi L. REV. 906, 912 (1968). See
generally Parker, Some Historical Observations on the Juvenile Court, 9
CRIM. L.Q. 467 (1967). Various reasons for this failure have been advanced:
inadequate financial support for the juvenile court programs; a lack of
proper training and skills among existing staffs necessary to implement the
treatments prescribed by the courts; loose drafting of juvenile court statutes
resulting In vagueness of extent of jurisdiction; a lack of full acceptance
of the rehabilitative aspect of the juvenile court, leading reform schools to
be viewed as no more than junior prisons; and a dismal lack of qualification
of juvenile court judges. See GAULT: WHAT NOW FOR THE JUrVENILE COURT?
9-12 (V. Nordin ed. 1968); TASK FORCE REPORT 7-8 (1967); Cadena, Due Process
and the Juvenile Offender, 1 ST. MARY'S L.J. 23, 24 (1969).
43. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
562(1966).
44. See TASK FORCE REPORT 9 (1967).
45. Note, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281, 284 (1967).
NOTES
a necessity to qualify the traditional view that informality is
per se a substantive benefit.
While it might be argued that the provision for a jury trial
would destroy the confidentiality of juvenile proceedings, again
the substantive benefits derived from the preservation of that
confidentiality must be examined. Confidentiality was originally
considered essential in order to protect the youthful offender
from any criminal stigma.46 If the child pleads guilty to the
offense charged, trial by jury will not be requested and the child's
secret will be preserved. Conversely, an innocent child's interest
lies in establishing his innocence, thereby preserving his repu-
tation. Additionally, the confidential nature of juvenile hearings
is violated each day. Most law enforcement agencies provide data
on juvenile offenders upon request to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the military services, and similar agencies. 47 In
light of these facts, it is submitted that the inclusion of a right
to trial by jury upon request would not further deteriorate the
confidential ideal of the system.
The strongest basis for the Court's denial of the right to jury
trial for juveniles is to be found in the statement that "[the jury
trial] would bring with it . . . the traditional delay . . .of the
adversary system and, possibly, the public trial. '48 The Court
was clearly and understandably desirous of keeping juvenile
court dockets relatively current, as compared with adult crim-
inal dockets in most large cities, so as to facilitate quick disposal
of juvenile cases in accord with the rehabilitative goal of the
system. This objective necessitated classification of the right to
trial by jury as being of somewhat lesser constitutional impor-
tance than the protections extended by the earlier cases. It is
at least arguable that, on a purely practical basis, the result of
the majority decision was necessary4 9 because the opposite result
46. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104, 109 (1909).
47. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1967); Note, 67 COLUM. L. REV. In fact,
in many jurisdictions, the public at large has access to "secret" juvenile
records. Such information is disclosed as a matter of routine to prospective
employers and such agencies as retail credit investigation companies, In
addition to the governmental and quasi-public agencies mentioned in the text.
48. 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1988 (1971).
49. However, it is possible to distinguish the probable effect of the jury
trial on juvenile proceedings from the problems added to adult criminal
trials by the jury requirement. There exists an extremely high incidence of
admissions of guilt in the juvenile system as well as the adult criminal sys-
tem. See TAsK FORCE REPORT 9 (1967). One might well speculate that counsel
for juveniles would often find it advantageous to waive the right to jury
trial when faced with strong evidence of guilt, or when it was felt that the
19711
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in the instant case would have undoubtedly resulted in an in-
crease in economic and administrative difficulties,50 and would
have required sweeping procedural changes in many juvenile
jurisdictions.
However, as a practical matter, in those jurisdictions which
provided for juvenile jury trials before the current decision, the
right was not often exercised. The dissenting opinion cites a
study demonstrating that over a period of more than five years,
cumulative requests for jury trials in those jurisdictions totaled
15 or less per year in 22 of 26 courts surveyed. The courts were
mostly in large metropolitan areas and handled about 75,000
total juvenile cases per year.51 It is submitted, therefore, that
the increase in caseload of the juvenile court caused by jury
trials would not be so burdensome as to outweigh the young
accused's right to a determination of his guilt or innocence by
an impartial finder of fact.
Additionally, the processing of juvenile cases in an expe-
ditious manner has its disadvantages. The dissent cites in this
regard an opinion by Judge De Ciantis of the Family Court of
Providence, Rhode Island. A portion of Judge De Ciantis' com-
prehensive and well-reasoned opinion is attached to the dissent
as an appendix, and states:
"In fact the very argument of expediency, suggesting 'super-
market' or 'assembly line' justice is one of the most forceful
arguments in favor of granting jury trials. By granting the
juvenile the right to a jury trial, we would, in fact, be pro-
tecting the accused from the judge who is under pressure
to move the cases, the judge with too many cases and not
enough time. It will provide a safeguard against the judge
who may be prejudiced against a minority group or who
may be prejudiced against the juvenile brought before him
child's best interests might be served by such a waiver. But this provides
no reason to preclude the availability of the right to those juveniles who
might choose to exercise it.
50. Other problems that have been cited as inevitable results by critics
of the jury trial include: (1) jury trials are too time-consuming because of
jury instructions and deliberations; (2) maintenance of juries is an exces-
sively expensive cost; (3) greater delays; and (4) unduly burdensome to
those citizens required to serve as jurors. See generally Comment, 64 Nw.
U.L. REV. 87, 113 (1969).
51. 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1994 (1971). The study cited was conducted by the Public
Defender Service for the District of Columbia and the Neighborhood Legal
Services Program of Washington, D.C., who jointly filed an amicus brief.
[Vol. 32
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because of some past occurence which was heard by the
same judge. ' '5 2
As to the objection that extending the right to jury trial
would possibly necessitate public trials, it is submitted that the
two are not interdependent. The presence of a jury is not tan-
tamount to the admission of the press and public generally, with
the accompanying widespread publicity that would result if the
latter two were present in the hearing room. Thus, the addition
of the jury is not essentially inconsistent with the prevailing
view that in order to protect the child there should be no right
to a public hearing in juvenile proceedings.5" Besides, as estab-
lished earlier, juvenile proceedings as now conducted are far
from secret. In addition to law enforcement agents present in
the hearing room, whose respective agencies have unlimited ac-
cess to records, witnesses for both the prosecution and defense
are usually present. The addition of a jury would not further
impair the non-public nature of the proceedings.
54
The majority implies that the use of a jury would in some
way impair the concern and sympathy that should be manifested
toward juveniles. 5 However, a comprehensive study evaluating
the efficacy of juries56 demonstrates that this contention is fal-
52. Id. at 1996. The entire appendix to the dissent provides an excellent
rebuttal of most of the justifications advanced by the majority for denial
of the right to the juvenile accused. The opinion was rendered in a case en-
titled In the Matter of McCloud, decided by Judge De Ciantis on January
15, 1971 in Family Court of Providence, Rhode Island.
53. See, e.g., State v. Cronin, 220 La. 233, 56 So.2d 242 (1951).
54. It is at least arguable that conversion of juvenile proceedings to a
fully public trial would improve, rather than impair, juvenile justice. Mr.
Justice Brennan distinguishes the cases consolidated in McKeiver on that
basis, voting to affirm the decision against the Pennsylvania juveniles, where
the public and press had been freely admitted to the courtroom, and voting
to reverse in the case from North Carolina, where the public had been
excluded over objection of counsel. 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1990 (1971).
Mr. Justice Brennan states: "[A] similar protection [to that afforded
by jury trial] may be obtained when an accused may in essence appeal to
the community at large, by focusing public attention upon the facts of his
trial, exposing improper judicial behavior to public view, and obtaining if
necessary executive redress through the medium of public indignation." Id.
at 1991.
Judge De Ciantis, citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), lists among
the benefits of public trial: the disclosure of key witnesses previously un-
known who may come forward with their testimony; the education of spec-
tators and the inspiration of confidence In judicial remedies; and an effec-
tive restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1997 (1971)
(appendix to dissenting opinion).
55. 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1989 (1971). See also note 42 supra.
56. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966). Although the
survey was not designed to procure juvenile data, that fact limits the sig-
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lacious. Sympathy for youthful defendants was a highly prev-
alent characteristic of the juries examined by the study. Of
three "sympathy factors"-age, sex, and race-evaluated through
questionnaires, age evoked the most sympathy, with defendants
under the age of 21 generating the greatest degree of sympathy.57
This demonstrates that juries are capable of displaying compas-
sion and concern for juveniles.
A feasible solution to any real difficulties raised by the ad-
dition of a right to jury trial would be the separation of the
juvenile proceeding into two completely distinct phases, adjudi-
cative and dispositional.5 8 The adjudicative phase, concerned ex-
clusively with fact-finding and guilt-determination, would pro-
vide the juvenile the protection of trial by jury upon request.
The dispositional phase is properly the exclusive province of an
experienced juvenile judge, and the area where his expertise is
most important. Judge De Ciantis described the benefits to be
gained from such a division of the hearing, and was further
quoted in the appendix to the dissent:
"The role of the jury will be only to ascertain whether the
facts, which give the court jurisdiction, have been estab-
lished beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury will not be con-
cerned with the social and psychological factors. These fac-
tors, along with prior record, family and educational back-
ground, will be considered by the judge during the disposi-
tional phase.
"Taking into consideration the social background and
other facts, the judge, during the dispositional phase, will
determine what disposition is in the best interests of the
child and society. It is at this stage that a judge's expertise
is most important, and the granting of a jury trial will not
prevent the judge from carrying out the basic philosophy of
the juvenile court."5 9
In conclusion, it is suggested that the instant decision is un-
niflcance of the information contained therein only slightly for the purpose
of this inquiry. "Youth" as used, in the survey may mean any age from 18
to the early twenties; but the data is at least as applicable to younger indi-
viduals who comprise the group subject to juvenile jurisdiction. Id. at 200.
57. Id. at 211 (Table 65 and comments).
58. Gault recognized the existence of three distinguishable phases of ajuvenile proceeding: the pre-judicial stage, the adjudicative hearing, and
the post-adjudicative or dispositional process. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13
(1967).
59. 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1997 (1971).
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satisfactory in that it ignores the possibility of a reconciliation
between the rehabilitative ideal of the juvenile court system and
the preservation of the individual rights of juveniles. Rehabili-
tation for the guilty, as well as freedom for the innocent, begins
with a fair and accurate determination of the facts." The jury
system both traditionally and practically is the best vehicle to
achieve that beginning. The sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to .. .an impartial jury ...."
Read literally, the clear indication is that all criminally accused
persons shall enjoy that right. The juvenile proceeding has been
classified as criminal in nature in the Gault case so as to deserve
other constitutional protections applicable in criminal proceed-
ings."' Practical arguments which militate against the right to
trial by jury in juvenile proceedings are not so insurmountable
as to preclude its adoption. The Duncan decision, holding that
due process of law necessarily involves the right to jury trial
when the accused faces a significant abridgement of his freedom,
should be particularly applicable to juvenile proceedings where
the child accused of a crime may face a period of confinement
many times longer than the imprisonment that would confront
an adult charged with the same offense. The McKeiver decision,
in creating a lesser standard of due process for juveniles, has ful-
filled an earlier prophetic observation of the Court:
"There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for
concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds:
that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor
the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated
for children."' 2
Lawrence Roe Dodd
DOUBLE JEOPARDY-DECLARATION OF MISTRIAL WITHOUT
CONSENT OF DEFENDANT
The defendant was charged in federal district court with
willfully assisting in the preparation of fraudulent income tax
60. TASK FoRcu REPORT 30 (1967).
61. 387 U.S. 1, 49-50 (1967).
62. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
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